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1019 
OHIO’S STANDING REQUIREMENTS AND THE UNWORKABLE 
PUBLIC-RIGHTS EXCEPTION 
Kristen Elia*  
“Standing is not an urban legend, a myth, or a mere concept. It is a 
means to access government.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Although filing a lawsuit is the first technical step in litigation, 
standing is the first substantive step to a lawsuit. It is the initial gate 
through which a litigant must pass in order to air his or her grievance 
before a court. When a court determines a litigant is without standing, it 
refuses to hear the case, despite the fact that “the claim may be correct,” 
because it has determined the litigant advancing it is “not properly 
situated to be entitled to its judicial determination.”2 Generally, in both 
state and federal court, a litigant will have standing if she demonstrates a 
(1) concrete (2) personal injury (3) caused by the defendant (4) which 
can be redressed by the court. Thus, standing doctrines focus largely on 
the party bringing the claim, not on the claim itself.3  
Federal standing doctrine derives mainly from Article III of the 
United States Constitution, which states there must be a “case or 
controversy” before a court can hear a claim.4 Federal standing doctrine 
is complex and changing. State courts are not required to follow federal 
standing requirements; however, most states do so voluntarily.5 But, 
states remain free to carve out their own standing exceptions, or to 
impose heightened standing requirements where they see fit.  
Ohio is an example of a state that follows federal standing but has 
carved out an exception to the general, or “traditional,” standing 
requirements. Under its public-rights exception, Ohio standing does not 
require a plaintiff to show actual personal injury in order to sue, so long 
as he presents or alleges “rare and extraordinary” issues that threaten 
 
              * Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted, 70 N.E.3d 502, 507 (Ohio 2016) (O’Neill, J., dissenting). 
 2. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 3531. 
 3. Id.  
 4. U.S. CONST. art III, §2. 
 5. Brief of Amici Curiae Ohio Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellants JobsOhio, et 
all. at 3, ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 139 Ohio St. 3d 520 (Ohio 2014). “Ohio courts, following 
the lead of their federal brethren, have similarly adhered to formal standing requirements, not only to 
protect the State’s deep interest in preserving the separation of powers, but also to ensure the efficient 
presentation and pursuit of cases by the parties, and to guard against issuing advisory opinions.” Id.  
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serious public injury.6 If he does so, he may bring suit on behalf of the 
public, despite not being personally harmed by the alleged action. 
This article details the creation of and murky history of the public-
rights exception in Ohio. Part II gives a general overview of standing. It 
identifies the basic standing requirements imposed on federal courts by 
the Supreme Court, and compares these standing requirements with 
Ohio’s. Part III addresses Ohio’s public-rights exception. It evaluates 
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, which established 
the public-rights exception.7  It additionally evaluates more recent Ohio 
cases which address the exception—ProgressOhio, Walgate, and 
Husted—in an attempt to identify and evaluate any changes made to the 
exception, since its creation.8 Part IV critiques the exception’s 
ambiguous meaning and argues the Supreme Court of Ohio should 
abandon it, as it is both unworkable and ultimately undefinable. It 
evaluates arguments for and against loosened justiciability standards, 
acknowledging that while relaxed standards may work elsewhere, 
Ohio’s public-rights exception’s undefined parameters make it 
unworkably vague; further, it violates separation of powers principles by 
conflating the judiciary with the legislative branch, and, finally, it 
impermissibly infringes on the legislative branch, as is the sole province 
of the Ohio General Assembly to create specialized standing rules. Part 
V concludes by reiterating the importance of justiciability broadly, and 
standing specifically, in the efficient resolution of appropriate cases. 
II.  FEDERAL STANDING AS COMPARED WITH OHIO STANDING 
Standing is a complex topic whose main requirements have changed 
substantially over the years. The following section briefly highlights the 
three key requirements for federal standing: injury, causation, and 
remedy. It outlines some of the problems courts face in evaluating these 
requirements. It then addresses Ohio’s standing requirements, compares 
them to the federal requirements, and introduces the public-rights 
exception. 
A.  Federal Standing Requirements 
Generally, federal standing exists where a plaintiff has “a concrete 
and ripe injury” that was the result of allegedly unlawful conduct 
 
 6. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1079 (Ohio 1999). 
 7. Id.  
 8. ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 13 N.E.3d 1101 (Ohio 2014); State ex rel Ullmann v. 
Husted, 70 N.E.3d 502 (Ohio 2016); State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich, 59 N.E.3d 1240 (Ohio 2016). 
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engaged in by the defendant, that the court can redress by hearing the 
controversy and issuing an appropriate remedy.9 Standing must exist at 
the time the plaintiff files suit, and a court may disregard subsequent 
events which cure plaintiff’s initially deficient standing.10 
In the context of governmental action, which ProgressOhio 
addresses, standing goes hand-in-hand with litigation asserting the 
illegality of some governmental action.11 Plaintiffs often sue under the 
theory that the executive or administrative action taken by a government 
official “goes beyond the limits of statutory authorization or 
constitutional limits,” or that a statute the official acted under “exceeds 
constitutional limits.”12 Conversely, plaintiffs sue under the theory that 
an elected official has refused to take an action they are required to take 
as an elected official.  
Standing requirements spring from two sources: constitutional and 
prudential. Constitutional requirements are derived from the text of 
Article III and are mandatory, while prudential factors are court-made 
limitations that are “flexible” and may be relaxed by courts when 
necessary.  
B.  Constitutional Standing Requirements 
The Supreme Court has articulated a threefold test of standing under 
Article III of the United States Constitution.13 Article III gives 
jurisdiction to courts to hear “cases” and “controversies.”14 From this 
language, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must show: (1) a 
distinct and palpable injury to himself; (2) that this injury is caused by 
the challenged activity; and (3) that this injury is apt to be redressed by a 
remedy that the court is prepared to give.15 While these requirements 
tend to blend together, the focus of courts remains on the injury prong.16  
One major problem with this threefold test is that these justiciability 
requirements are unclear from the start, and, further, they “have 
generated a large number of cases and an enormous amount of academic 
commentary,”17 which has added to the challenges “that inevitably beset 
 
 9. Michael Solimine, The Ohio Constitution—Then and Now: An Examination of the Law and 
History of the Ohio Constitution On the Occasion of its Bicentennial: Recalibrating Justiciability in 
Ohio Courts, 51 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531, 532 (2004). 
 10. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Id. at § 3531.4.  
 14. U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. 
 15. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at § 3531.4. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Solimine, supra note 9, at 533. 
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every attempt to articulate and apply any clear principles of standing.”18 
While cases and academic commentary often illuminate unclear 
standards in other areas of law, the cases addressing standing have done 
just the opposite—they have further muddied the already foggy 
“standing” water.  
The first prong—injury—requires the plaintiff to arrive at the 
courthouse with some presently existing, tangible damage. Like all 
prongs of the threefold test, the injury prong has developed significantly 
over the years. Generally, however, injury itself is not contested, even in 
public litigation cases, as the injury is usually apparent.19 Standing is 
readily found when the injury is asserted to self or property.20 The 
difficulty with injury arises because the injury prong blends with the 
third prong—the inquiry into whether the court can and should remedy 
the wrong.21 Present injury “shades into the risk of future injury, or the 
denial of an opportunity that might not have led to a desired benefit,” 
turning “[i]njury itself” into “a term of the standing art.”22  
The second prong—causation—presents similar problems. The 
causation prong has been described as “slippery,” and there is “tension” 
between conceptual and pragmatic approaches to causation.23 Within the 
topic of standing, as in other areas of law, causation is subject to both 
uncertainty and manipulation.24 Because of the uncertainty surrounding 
causation, judges may be tempted to use it as an excuse to avoid 
deciding a case.25 In the words of Justice Brandeis, justiciability doctrine 
provides ample opportunities for “not doing,” and causation easily 
provides one such opportunity.26  
Finally, the third prong—redressability—is “no more stable than the 
other two.”27 The plaintiff must prove that some personal benefit will 
result from a remedy that the court can give.28 One of the problems 
courts have in granting remedy is that “predictions of remedial benefit 
may be skewed so as to recognize, deny, or simply confuse standing,” 
meaning that, similar to the causation prong, courts frequently 
 
 18. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at § 3531. 
 19. Id. at § 3531.4. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. The Supreme Court “has long required a plaintiff to assert more than the ‘generalized 
interest of all citizens in constitutional governance’ to have standing.” Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 
5, at 5.  
 23. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at § 3531.5. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id.  
 26. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 
114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1835 (2001). 
 27. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, at § 3531.6. 
 28. Id. 
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manipulate the uncertainty of the remedy prong in order to recognize or 
refuse to recognize standing.29 
C.  Prudential Standing Factors  
The prudential factors of standing are “non-constitutional in nature,” 
and therefore may be relaxed when necessary. There are a number of 
prudential requirements, and a discussion of each is beyond the scope of 
this article. One important factor, however, is that litigants cannot plead 
only generalized grievances, and they ordinarily may advance only their 
own rights and not the rights of third parties.30 
D.  Broader Concerns of Justiciability  
Aside from the practical difficulties the individual prongs present, 
there exists a broader difficulty with standing—in part because standing 
is one of the core concepts of justiciability; it therefore addresses the 
“proper scope” of the court’s role in our system of government. One 
commentator believes problems with standing can be attributed to the 
unstable nature of public opinion on this topic; as, at any time “judges, 
lawyers, and society at large divide on the proper role to be played by 
the courts in addressing large public issues.”31 Opinion may shift, for a 
time, in favor of judicial activism, with the majority of people (lawyers 
and non-lawyers alike) believing the judiciary should have a livelier and 
more involved role in deciding political controversies. At other times, 
the majority view may favor judicial restraint, believing the role of the 
judiciary should be narrowly confined, and judges should defer to the 
legislature in almost all circumstances. Unfortunately, these broad 
divisions and changing opinions are stuffed “into the narrow 
terminology of standing.”32  
Broader issues of the evolving and changing nature of justiciability 
influence the way courts view the subsets of justiciability: ripeness and 
mootness. Ripeness refers to the readiness of a case for litigation.33 
Depending on the political climate of the time, courts may feel pressured 
to decide cases that are not entirely “ripe,” or a case that addresses a 
political concern, lest a “plaintiff's real injury go without redress or 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. Solimine, supra note 9, at 533. 
 31. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2. 
 32. Id. 
 33. “For instance, if a statute has not yet harmed a party but may do so in the future, the case is 
not ripe for judicial review.” Basil M. Loeib, Abuse of Power: Certain State Courts Are Disregarding 
Standing And Original Jurisdiction Principles So They Can Declare Tort Reform Unconstitutional, 84 
MARQ. L. REV. 491, 496 (2000). 
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public officials be allowed to continue an unlawful course of conduct.”34  
This pressure to decide a politically-charged case clashes with judicial 
restraint, as there are often just as many reasons not to decide difficult 
issues of broad public importance. A single litigation “may not provide 
sufficient information to support a wise decision” and “[a]n improvident 
decision may harm more or less narrow classes of individuals who are 
not before the court,” botching matters that are much better left to the 
political organs of society.35 In this light, standing serves to “ensure that 
a court will render its decision in ideal conditions—in a fact-specific 
controversy where the court cant test its principles and precedents 
against real facts” and real people, with real consequences for those real 
people.36  
All of the above issues—the individual prongs of standing (and their 
evolving nature), the broader concerns of justiciability (and its evolving 
nature), along with the particular concerns of ripeness and mootness 
(and their own instability, based on political climate)—contribute to the 
intricacy of standing. These issues additionally substantiate the criticism 
that federal standing is “no more than a convenient tool to avoid 
uncomfortable issues or to disguise a surreptitious ruling on the 
merits.”37  
E.  Ohio Standing Requirements 
State standing law, for the most part, voluntarily mirrors federal 
standing law.38 This is true in Ohio as well, despite the fact that the 
language of the Ohio Constitution is not analogous to Article III’s 
language. The Ohio Constitution vests “the judicial power of the state” 
in the courts. 39 It reads, “The courts of common pleas and divisions 
thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters 
and such powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers and 
agencies as may be provided by law.”40  
Because Ohio’s constitution has been interpreted roughly in line with 
the federal constitution, Ohio’s traditional standing exists in roughly the 
same terms as federal traditional standing—where a plaintiff has 
“alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, as to 
 
 34. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 7. 
 37. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2. 
 38. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 4-5. “This Court [Ohio Supreme Court], in turn, has 
held that federal principles of standing apply to cases brought in Ohio state courts.” Id.  
 39. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 40. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 4(B). 
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ensure that the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an 
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of 
judicial resolution.”41 That is, a plaintiff must have (1) an injury that 
takes the form of a “personal stake in the controversy,” and is therefore 
not just a generalized grievance shared by the majority of the 
population, (2) that can be redressed by the court.  
Additionally, because states remain free to craft their standing 
requirements as they see fit, they may require additional factors in 
certain situations.42 For example, Ohio has added three requirements 
when a plaintiff wants to attack the constitutionality of a piece of 
legislation. These added requirements are: (1) the private litigant “must 
generally show that he or she has suffered or is threatened with direct 
and concrete injury in a manner or degree different from that suffered by 
the public in general;” (2) that “the law in question has caused the 
injury;” (3) and that the relief requested will redress the injury.43 
Conversely, states may relax standing requirements when appropriate. 
Ohio has created a particularly unique exception to traditional standing 
requirements, called the “public-rights” exception. This exception 
lessens the general threshold of standing in certain circumstances; it 
“departed from federal doctrine” by “lower[ing] the thresholds of 
justiciability” when the issue brought by the litigant is of a certain 
magnitude.44 The exception allows a plaintiff to bring suit despite the 
fact that he or she has suffered no personal injury if the suit falls within 
the “rare and extraordinary” situation where the public interest is at 
stake.45 Thus, it allows a plaintiff to bring a generalized grievance, if the 
issue is of enough importance to the public at large.  
III.  CASES ESTABLISHING THE PUBLIC-RIGHTS EXCEPTION 
The following section describes and evaluates the Ohio cases 
establishing or modifying the public-rights exception. It begins with 
State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, which established 
the exception. It then examines more recent cases, which loosely address 
the exception without significantly modifying or further defining it, but 
also without finding standing under it. It concludes by summarizing 
where the exception is today, based on the current case law addressing 
it. 
 
 41. State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1081 (Ohio 1999).  
 42. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 3. 
 43. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1081. 
 44. Solimine, supra note 9, at 532. 
 45. The Supreme Court of Ohio refers to this exception as a “means to vindicate the general 
public interest.” Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1083. 
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A.  The Founding Public-Rights Case: State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial 
Lawyers v. Sheward 
Sheward established the public-rights exception in Ohio’s standing 
doctrine. In Sheward, the plaintiffs-relators46 filed an original action in 
prohibition and mandamus against six Ohio common pleas court judges, 
in their official capacities and as representing those similarly situated.47 
Plaintiffs-relators challenged the constitutionality of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
350, a comprehensive and lengthy tort-reform bill.48 In their complaint, 
plaintiffs-relators asserted eight claims, but their primary claim was that 
the bill constituted an improper legislative usurpation of judicial power, 
and was therefore an intrusion into the exclusive authority of the 
judiciary, in violation of various sections of the Ohio Constitution.49 
More specifically, they argued the bill violated Ohio’s separation of 
powers principals by reenacting a piece of legislation previously found 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Defendants filed 
motions to dismiss, arguing the plaintiff-relators lacked standing.50 
Defendants argued the plaintiffs-relators failed to allege the kind of 
personal injury necessary for standing in Ohio, and that they merely 
pleaded “insufficient generalized public interest” which did not meet the 
personal injury requirement.51 
The court found both that the plaintiffs-relators had standing and that 
the bill was unconstitutional “in toto.”52 On the standing issue, the court 
allowed the action to proceed as a “public action,” the goal of which is 
 
 46. The plaintiffs-relators were: The Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers (OATL), Ohio AFL-CIO, 
Richard Mason, and William A. Burga. Id. at 1062. A “relator” is someone who files a mandamus or 
quo warranto proceeding, a proceeding which requests someone show by what warrant they hold an 
office or position. Black’s Law Dictionary, available at: http://thelawdictionary.org/relator/.  
 47. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1062. 
 48. Id. Am.Sub.H.B. No. 350, 146 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3867, was passed by the Ohio Senate on 
September 11, 1996, and by the Ohio House of Representatives on September 26, 1996. The bill was 
then signed into law by former Governor George Voinovich on October 28, 1996. It took effect on 
January 27, 1997. The bill attempted civil justice reform in Ohio. It amended, enacted, and repealed 
over one hundred sections of the Ohio Revised Code dealing with laws on torts and other civil actions. 
The changes addressed: the interest on judgments, immunity and liability of political subdivisions, 
liability for the condition of premises open to the public for accessing growing agricultural produce, 
sales of securities and class action requirements there for joint and several liability, contributory and 
comparative fault, assumption of risk and apportionment of damages, among many other things. Id. n2 
and n6. 
 49. Id. at 1062. 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 1080. 
 52. Id. at 1088; The court found the legislation unconstitutional for intruding upon judicial power 
by declaring itself constitutional, reenacting legislation the Court previously struck down as 
unconstitutional and by interfering with the Court’s right to set court procedure. Because of these 
violations, the bill violated Ohio Constitution’s separation of powers provision. Id at 1076. 
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to enforce a “public right.”53 It held it would entertain a public action in 
“the rare and extraordinary” case in which plaintiffs challenge the 
constitutionality of a legislative enactment “on grounds that it operates, 
directly and broadly, to divest the courts of judicial power.”54 Finally, 
the court held that outside of the case at hand (dealing with legislation 
infringing upon the judicial role), where a plaintiff brings an action, the 
object of which “is to procure the enforcement or protection of a public 
right, the relator need not show any legal or special individual interest in 
the result, it being sufficient that relator is an Ohio citizen and, as such, 
interested in the execution of the laws of the state.”55  
In creating the exception, the court discussed traditional standing at 
length, in an effort to justify its departure from it. It addressed the way 
in which standing intersects with broader concerns of justiciability and 
the role of the court in our system of government. It explained that 
“standing embodies general concerns about how the courts should 
function in a democratic system,”56 and that these concerns “become 
more acute” when “there may be an intrusion into areas committed to 
another and coequal branch of government.”57 Here, the court implied 
that although the role of the court is generally limited to deciding only 
actual cases or controversies that come before it (generally involving 
private parties), it needs to step out of these narrow bounds when the 
legislature assumes judicial authority.58 It cautioned that this power to 
declare legislative acts unconstitutional is a “power burdened with a 
duty,” not a higher power or act of superior wisdom on the part of the 
court.59 For this reason, the court further warned, when the private rights 
of a person or property are not at issue, the court must be careful that it 
is not “simply asked to regulate the affairs of another branch of 
government.”60  
The court further explained the need for additional requirements when 
challenging the constitutionality of legislation. In the majority of cases 
brought by a private person, the overarching question revolves around 
whether that person has enough of a stake in the controversy so “as to 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1079. 
 55. Id. at 1084-1085. 
 56. Id. at 1080. 
 57. Id at 1081. “It has been long and well established that it is the duty of every judicial tribunal 
to decide actual controversies between parties legitimately affected by specific facts and to render 
judgments which can be carried into effect. It has become settled judicial responsibility for courts to 
refrain from giving opinions on abstract propositions and to avoid the imposition by judgment of 
premature declarations or advise upon potential controversies. The extension of this principle includes 
enactments of the General Assembly.” Id at 1080. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id at 1081. 
 60. Id. 
9
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ensure that the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an 
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of 
judicial resolution.”61 So, when a private person wants to attack the 
constitutionality of a piece of legislation, the court must toe a fine line in 
order to avoid invading the rights of another coequal branch. For this 
reason, the court has held that the private litigant “must generally show 
that he or she has suffered or is threatened with direct and concrete 
injury in a manner or degree different” from the injury suffered by the 
general public.62 Further, of course, the litigant must show that the law 
in question caused the injury, and that the relief he requests of the court 
will redress the injury.63  
After outlining these background standing principles, the court 
explained its break with federal standing requirements. It explained that 
although the federal requirement for injury is “grounded” in the 
constitutional requirements of Section 2, Article III of the U.S. 
Constitution, federal standing is not binding on state courts, as “[the 
Ohio Supreme Court is] free to dispense with the requirement for injury 
where the public interest so demands.”64 While standing requirements 
are binding in federal courts, standing in state courts is merely “a self-
imposed rule of restraint.”65 So, according to the court, states need not 
“become enmeshed in the federal complexities and technicalities” of 
standing, which impede the swift adjudication of valid claims.66 Instead, 
the court explained, state courts can dispense with these frustrations in 
favor of “just and expeditious determination on the ultimate merits.”67 
Thus, the court clarified that it could, and should, cast off the burden of 
federal standing and craft an exception in the interest of public justice. 
The court further suggested that this new exception is not novel in 
Ohio jurisprudence. It claimed to have a longstanding tradition of 
allowing issues to be litigated “in a form of action that involves no 
rights or obligations peculiar to named parties” when they “are of great 
importance and interest” to Ohio’s population.68 It explained this 
tradition in terms of “public” versus “private” rights. It held that where a 
public right, as differentiated from a purely private right, is involved, the 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 1082. For example, a litigant has the right to sue to enforce the performance of a public 
duty, because, as a matter of public policy, a “citizen does have such an interest in his government as to 
give him capacity to maintain a proper action to enforce the performance of a public duty affecting 
himself and citizens generally.” Id at 1083. 
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citizen suing “need not show any special interest therein” and may sue 
simply as a citizen.69 Finally, the court clarified that the public-rights 
doctrine exists independent of any statute authorizing it.70 
Applying the newly-formed exception to the case at hand, the court 
held that, because the bill usurped judicial authority, the issues in this 
case were of enough importance to the public to justify allowing 
plaintiffs-relators to bring the action as a public action. The court held 
that the people of Ohio, through their constitution, “delegated their 
judicial power to the courts, and have expressly prohibited the General 
Assembly from exercising it.”71 In the court’s view, if the General 
Assembly could reenact legislation previously held unconstitutional by 
the court and could require the courts to treat those pieces of legislation 
as valid and uphold them, “‘the whole power of government would be at 
once become absorbed and taken into itself by the legislature.’”72  
The dissenting judges emphasized that the plaintiffs-relators lacked 
traditional standing and the court therefore should not have heard the 
case, let alone create the exception. As one commentator notes, although 
the dissenting justices were “not directly addressing the prior ‘public 
rights’ cases of the court,” the dissent “appeared to argue that the 
majority had improperly expanded the scope of the public-rights 
exception.”73 
B.  ProgressOhio v. JobsOhio 
In ProgressOhio, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that ProgressOhio, 
a nonprofit organization, did not have standing to sue JobsOhio, a 
“public-private development corporation” which, in essence, privatized 
the former Ohio Department of Development as a way to attract greater 
economic activity to the state.74 ProgressOhio alleged JobsOhio violated 
constitutional prohibitions on spending, corporate creation, and 
corporate investment.75  
The court analyzed standing both in terms of traditional standing and 
public-rights standing. It first held that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
under traditional standing requirements; it believed ProgressOhio had no 
 
 69. Id. at 1083; see also State ex rel. Cater v. N. Olmstead, 631 N.E.2d 1048, 1054-1055 (1994) 
(holding a taxpayer has standing to enforce the public’s right to proper execution of city charter removal 
provisions, whether or not he receives any private or personal benefit). 
 70. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1083. 
 71. Id. at 1084. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Solimine, supra note 9, at 539. 
 74. Joshua Crabtree, Behind Closed Doors: An Argument for State Constitutional Standing to 
Challenge Public—Private Development Corporations, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1423, 1423 (2015). 
 75. ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 13 N.E.3d 1101, 1103 (Ohio 2014). 
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direct, personal stake in the outcome of the case.76 It held that mere 
“ideological opposition” to a program or legislative enactment is not 
enough to satisfy standing.77 So, because ProgressOhio did not prove a 
personal stake in the outcome, it therefore lacked the direct injury 
necessary to give it common-law standing.78  
Additionally, addressing the public-rights exception, the court found 
appellants did not qualify for it. It found they did not present an issue of 
public interest important enough to fall under the Sheward exception.79 
The court explained that the public-rights exception is extraordinary; it 
eviscerates the personal-injury prong of standing, as it “provides that 
‘when the issues sought to be litigated are of great importance and 
interest to the public, they may be resolved in a form of action that 
involves no rights or obligations peculiar to named parties.’”80 Because 
it is an abrogation of the traditional injury-prong, in order to succeed in 
bringing a public-rights case, the litigant “must allege ‘rare and 
extraordinary’ issues that threaten serious public injury.” It explained 
that, even if likely illegal, not “all allegedly illegal or unconstitutional 
government actions rise to this level of importance.”81 Thus, the court 
implied that plaintiff’s claim fell into this latter category—even if the 
legislation they challenged was illegal or unconstitutional, it was not 
extraordinary enough to qualify.  
Finally, plaintiff’s action was a declaratory-judgment action, and the 
public-rights exception applies only to original actions in mandamus and 
or prohibition. Therefore, aside from the fact that the litigants did not 
present a rare and extraordinary issue justifying use of the exception, 
they brought the wrong kind of action.  
Thus, ProgressOhio seems to “narrow[] the public-right doctrine to 
apply only to original actions in mandamus and/or prohibition” that 
present the kind of rare and extraordinary public issues needed to invoke 
the exception.82  
C.  State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich 
In Walgate, a number of plaintiffs, both private and institutional, sued 
Ohio Governor John Kasich and various Ohio lottery organizations 
 
 76. Id. at 1103. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 1104. 
 80. Id. at 1105. 
 81. Id.  
 82. State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted, 70 N.E.3d 502, 507 (Ohio 2016) (O’Neil, J., dissenting).  
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(collectively “the state”).83 Plaintiffs raised 17 claims in their amended 
complaint, and sued under the theory that numerous pieces of 
legislation, which established casinos in Ohio, were unconstitutional.84  
The Supreme Court of Ohio held only one of the litigants had 
standing to sue. Plaintiffs alleged standing based on the “negative 
effects of gambling.”85 The court rejected this argument, pointing out 
that “negative effects of gambling that appellants allege[d] [did] not 
constitute concrete injuries to appellants that are different in manner or 
degree from those caused to the general public, [and] were not caused 
by the state's conduct, and cannot be redressed by the requested relief.” 
86 Similarly, it held they did not have standing based on status as an 
Ohio public school teacher or parent, or as contributors to “special 
funds” for schools.87 It analyzed all of their standing claims under 
traditional standing requirements, and did not address the public-rights 
exception.  
The dissent did address the public-rights exception, arguing it should 
 
 83. State ex rel. Walgate v. Kasich, 59 N.E.3d 1240 (Ohio 2016). Plaintiff-appellants were 
“Robert L. Walgate Jr., David P. Zanotti, the American Policy Roundtable (“Ohio Roundtable”), Sandra 
L. Walgate, Agnew Sign & Lighting, Inc. (“ASL”), Linda Agnew, Paula Bolyard, Jeffrey Malek, 
Michelle Watkin-Malek, Thomas W. Adams, and Donna J. Adams.” Id. at 1243-1244. They filed a 
complaint in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, and were originally “seeking a declaratory 
judgment, injunctive relief, and a writ of mandamus. In January 2012, those parties, along with 
plaintiffs-appellants, Joe Abraham and Frederick Kinsey, filed an amended complaint in the case. The 
amended complaint named as defendants (appellees here) Governor John R. Kasich; the State Lottery 
Commission; the interim director and members of the State Lottery Commission; the Casino Control 
Commission; the chairman, vice chairman, executive director, and members of the Casino Control 
Commission; and Ohio Tax Commissioner Joseph W. Testa (collectively, “the state”).” Kasich, 59 
N.E.3d at 1244. 
 84. “The first ten claims relate to the constitutionality of VLTs and H.B. 1, the act that 
authorized them. Those claims allege, in part, that (1) VLT operation exceeds the state's authority to 
conduct lotteries, (2) the lottery commission will violate the constitution by not conducting VLT games 
in their entirety, (3) the net proceeds of VLT games will be distributed in an unconstitutional manner, 
(4) allowing VLTs to be operated by racing facilities will violate the prohibition against the state's 
financial involvement in private enterprise, (5) H.B. 1 violates the one-subject rule of Article II, Section 
15(D) of the Ohio Constitution , and (6) in enacting H.B. 1 the General Assembly failed to comply with 
the requirement in Article II, Section 15(C) of the Ohio Constitution that each House consider every bill 
on three different days.  
  Claims 11 through 16 in the amended complaint challenge legislative actions that relate to 
Ohio's four casinos, particularly H.B. 277 and H.B. 519. Included in these are claims that legislation 
pertaining to the commercial-activity tax, casino-license fees, and tax exclusion for promotional gaming 
credits, as well as legislation allowing for multiple casino facilities in one city and graduated payments 
of the required initial investment, exceeded the legislature's constitutional authority. 
  The final claim in the amended complaint is that Article XV, Section 6 of the Ohio 
Constitution, H.B. 1, H.B. 277, and H.B. 519 violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution by granting a monopoly to the gaming operators whom 
the state approved.” Id. at 1244.  
 85. Id at 1245.  
 86. Id. at 1247-1248. 
 87. Id. at 1251. 
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have applied to give the litigants standing, regardless of the substantive 
strength of their claims. Justice Pfeifer argued, “[t]his case is of great 
interest to the public” because it involved a piece of legislation in which 
“over 3,000,000 Ohioans cast a vote.”88 Because of the importance of 
the legislation, based on the voter turnout, “the litigants deserve the right 
to be heard.”89 Thus, Justice Pfeifer implied (without explaining fully) 
that “rare and extraordinary” issues are presented, thus triggering the 
exceptions application, where plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of 
legislation that a mass amount of citizens voted for.90  
Justice Pfeifer addressed the argument that, if the exception were 
applied here, it would open the courtroom doors to anyone who wanted 
to challenge any piece of legislation. He argued that while Ohioans 
should not have the unlimited ability to challenge provisions of the Ohio 
Constitution, the court should not be concerned with an “avalanche of 
cases asserting public-rights standing” because the court has shown 
previously that it is able “to reject frivolous, inconsequential, or inane 
claims.”91 Here, he believed the court should hear the claim because the 
litigants brought before the court “significant and important issues that 
affect millions of Ohioans.”92 For this reason, the court “should not 
throw up its hands and sputter ‘but these people have not suffered a 
differentiated harm.’”93 
D.  State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted 
In Husted, a plaintiff again attempted to challenge the JobsOhio act; 
the court again refused to find standing. It held that the trial court 
properly dismissed a citizen’s mandamus action, as the citizen lacked 
standing under the public-rights exception and alleged no concrete 
injury which would give her traditional standing.94 She alleged the act 
was illegal because Ohio’s wholesale liquor business funded JobsOhio, 
so those who purchase liquor in Ohio are “forced” to fund JobsOhio.95  
The Court rejected this argument. It first addressed the general 
 
 88. Kasich, 59 N.E.3d at 1255 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). 
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1255. 
 93. Id.  
 94. State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted, 70 N.E.3d 502, 504 (Ohio 2016);Id.; A citizen’s mandamus 
action is a petition to a superior court, requesting it issue an order to a lower court, government body or 
corporation, requiring or forbidding it from doing something; The JobsOhio act, as mentioned elsewhere 
in this article, authorized the creation of a nonprofit organization for the purposes of promoting 
economic development, job creation, retention, and training, and recruiting business to Ohio.  
 95. Id. at 504. State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted, 70 N.E.3d 502, 504 (Ohio 2016). 
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requirements for standing, and differentiated them from the public-rights 
exception. It said that “traditional standing ‘requires litigants to show, at 
a minimum, that they have suffered “(1) an injury that is (2) fairly 
traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct, and (3) likely to 
be redressed by the requested relief.”’ 96 Further, standing depends not 
on the merits of the plaintiff’s claim, but rather on “‘whether the 
plaintiffs have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the 
controversy that they are entitled to have a court hear their case.’”97 The 
court then articulated the Sheward exception to the “personal stake” 
(injury) requirement.98 It reiterated that to qualify for this exception, the 
plaintiff must allege “rare and extraordinary” issues that “threaten 
serious public injury.”99 Further, the court clarified that the exception 
only applies to original actions in mandamus or prohibition (as 
suggested in ProgressOhio). 
The Husted plaintiff alleged she had standing under both the 
traditional test and the public-rights exception because she was a citizen, 
taxpayer, business owner, consultant, elector of Ohio, and a person who 
has purchased alcohol in Ohio in the preceding six months.100  She 
asserted that “a private party has standing under the public-right doctrine 
to seek to force the attorney general to act when a conflict of interest 
prevents him or her from doing so.”101 The court found she already 
waived any argument of traditional standing, and even if she had not 
waived it, she alleged no concrete injury sufficient to satisfy it.102  
Further, she did not meet the public-rights exception because she 
misapplied precedent. The precedent she cited—State ex rel. Trauger v. 
Nash—did not support her assertion of public-rights standing.103 In 
Trauger, the private citizen’s mandamus action charged the governor 
with failing to fulfill his statutory duty to appoint an elector to fill the 
spot of lieutenant governor.104 Here, plaintiff alleged R.C. 2733.04 
“imposes upon the attorney general the duty to file an action in quo 
 
 96. Id. at 505. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 506. 
 102. State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted, 70 N.E.3d 502, 506 (Ohio 2016). 
 103. Plaintiff cited State ex rel. Trauger v. Nash, 64 N.E. 558 (1902). In that case, the private 
citizen’s mandamus action alleged the governor failed to fill a vacancy which he was legally bound to 
fill. Here, however, the plaintiff was alleging that R.C. 2733.04 imposes on the attorney general the duty 
to file an action in quo warranto. Id. at 506. This is incorrect because the duty to file an action in quo 
warranto is subject to the attorney general’s discretion in deciding whether an action can be established 
by proof. Id. 
 104. State ex rel. Trauger v. Nash, 64 N.E. 558 (1902). 
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warranto.”105 But, R.C. 2733.04 gives the attorney general discretion to 
file a quo warranto case when he “has good reason to believe” such a 
case “can be established by proof.”106 So, Trauger did not support her 
assertion of standing under the public-rights doctrine.107 Finally, her 
other public-rights arguments mirrored those made in ProgressOhio, 
and the court determined there that those arguments were insufficient (as 
they did not allege rare and extraordinary issues that threaten serious 
public injury).108 
The dissent, however, argued that without looking at the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claim, the court could not determine that her case did not have 
issues of great importance to the general public, which would give her 
standing under the public-rights exception. 
E.  State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State 
On January 24, 2018, in a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court of 
Ohio decided State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State.109 In it, the 
court vehemently criticized Sheward without overturning it, denouncing 
its holding as “questionable” and its possible repercussions as 
“egregious and problematic.”110  
In State ex rel. Food and Water Watch, Food and Water Watch 
(“FWW”) and FreshWater Accountability Project (“FWAP”) filed a 
complaint on behalf of their members, requesting a writ of mandamus to 
compel certain government officials to promulgate rules relating to the 
storage, recycling, treatment, processing, and disposal of waste 
associated with oil and gas drilling.111 Under Revised Code 1509.03(A), 
the chief of the oil and gas resources management division of the Ohio 
Department of Natural Resources (“ODNR”) “shall adopt” rules 
regulating the operation of oil and gas wells and production facilities.112 
The rules must address certain drilling safety measures and must govern 
the issuance of permits for the handling of certain waste materials.113 
 
 105. State ex rel. Ullmann v. Husted, 70 N.E.3d 502, 506 (Ohio 2016). 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. 
 109. State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State, 100 N.E.3d 391 (Ohio 2018). 
 110. Id. at 398. 
 111. Id. at 393. Respondents-appellants included Rick Simmers, the chief of the oil-and-gas 
resources-management division of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, and James Zehringer, the 
director of ODNR. Id.  
 112. Id. at 394  
 113. Id. The rules must address including safety in well drilling and operations, protection of the 
public water supply, and containment and disposal of drilling and production waste. R.C. 
1509.03(A)(1), (2), and (4). The chief is additionally required to adopt rules regulating the storage, 
recycling, treatment, processing, and disposal of brine and other waste substances. R.C. 1509.22(C). 
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FFW and FWAP sued under the theory that the ODNR had not issued 
the rules required by the statute; specifically, they alleged ODNR had 
not issued rules regulating the permit process for handling and treating 
waste issued by oil and gas operations.114 In lieu of issuing rules 
regulating permits, the ODNR had instead allowed facilities to operate 
under a “temporary authorization,” which was to remain effective until 
the division chief issued rules under R.C. 1509.22(C).115  
Adopting a magistrate’s suggestion that plaintiffs could not establish 
traditional standing based on injuries alleged by their members, public-
rights standing, or taxpayer standing, the Tenth District Court of 
Appeals granted summary judgment to the state officials.116 On appeal 
to the Supreme Court of Ohio, FFW and FWAP alleged they had 
standing based on three theories.117 Relevant to this article is FFW and 
FWAP’s argument that they had standing to force the enforcement of a 
public right and therefore did not need to show individual interest or 
injury.118  
FWAP invoked the public-right exception, but argued that the court 
should not apply Sheward’s “rare and extraordinary” requirement, 
reasoning that, unlike the relators in Sheward, it was not challenging the 
overall constitutionality of a regulation, but was merely seeking a writ of 
mandamus to have it performed.119 The court noted that it has not 
granted a public-rights exception under Sheward in 15 years.120 It held 
that “[e]ven assuming that this court would still grant a party a public-
right-doctrine exception to standing” in an appropriate case, “FWAP has 
not met its burden to demonstrate that this case is a ‘rare and 
extraordinary case’ worthy of the exception.”121 
Aside from rejecting plaintiffs’ argument, the court seems to have 
constrained Sheward further.122 It described Sheward as a “deeply 
divided” four-to-three decision, one in which the court held it would 
entertain a public action only in the rare and extraordinary situation 
 
Finally, the rules must govern permits issued for the handling or brine and “other waste substances.” Id.  
 114. State ex rel. Food & Water Watch,  100 N.E.3d at 394. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 395.  
 117. Id. They argued that they met traditional standing requirements by having members injured 
by the “deprivation of their rights under R.C. 1509.22 and the Ohio Administrative Procedure Act. The 
court rejected this argument and affirmed the Court of Appeals and found the plaintiffs lacked 
traditional standing (through their members).  It held that the health injuries alleged in the affidavits 
submitted by plaintiffs members were abstract “or suspected,” and were not concrete enough to confer 
standing under standing’s injury prong. Id. at 397.  
 118. Id. at 395. 
 119. Id. at 398. 
 120. Id. at 399. 
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 398. 
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where the challenged statute operates “directly and broadly to divest the 
courts of judicial power.”123 Thus, the court emphasized the contentious 
nature of the case, the specific facts presented in it, and the extreme 
narrowness of Sheward’s actual holding.  
Significantly, the court also addressed the fact that standing 
exceptions can lead to abuse through unwise and unasked-for judicial 
policy-making. It discussed the fact that when issues brought before the 
court are of such importance to the public that they are resolved without 
standing, it “can unfortunately result in ‘political opportunism, allowing 
the majority to invalidate a disfavored law using a questionable 
approach.’”124 It feared “Sheward essentially allows this court to engage 
in policy-making by ruling on the legislation of the General Assembly” 
where there has been no injury caused by the legislation.125 Even more 
suggestively, the court seems to have come close to overruling the case 
as a whole, describing any authority provided by the case as “at best, 
questionable.”126 Finally, it harped on the potential for the exception to 
lead to the court issuing advisory opinions, a result the court described 
as the “more egregious and problematic abuse,” which long-standing 
Ohio law prohibits.127  
F.  The “current” criteria (as gathered from the original and the more 
recent cases addressing the exception).  
The cases establishing and applying the public-rights exception are 
not clear on exactly what that exception is or when it can be used. 
Sheward seems to say that the public-rights exception is something Ohio 
courts have recognized in the past, yet “until 1954 only one of the cases 
referred to a ‘public right,’ and in any event the cases are not legion.”128 
The following section pieces together the parameters of the exception, 
as created in Sheward and amended in later cases. 
Sheward was decided in 1999. It allows for a “public action,” in 
which plaintiffs seek to enforce a “public right” even where the 
individual has not suffered any injury because of the challenged action. 
It held the court would entertain these kinds of actions in “the rare and 
extraordinary” case in which relators challenge the constitutionality of a 
legislative enactment “on grounds that it operates, directly and broadly, 
to divest the courts of judicial power.” Thus, the exception exists in the 
 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 399.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 398. 
 128. Solimine, supra note 9, at 543. 
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“rare and extraordinary” case where a plaintiff (an Ohio citizen or 
groups of citizens) seeks to vindicate a public right and presents issues 
of “great importance” that threaten “serious public injury.” 
ProgressOhio, a case decided in 2014, restated the core language of 
the exception without doing anything to change it. In ProgressOhio, the 
court described the exception as one that exists only “when the issues 
sought to be litigated are of great importance and interest to the 
public” and plaintiffs “must allege ‘rare and extraordinary’ issues that 
threaten serious public injury” to qualify for the exception. The only 
clarity this case may have contributed to the exception is in the court’s 
statement that “Not all allegedly illegal or unconstitutional government 
actions rise to this level of importance.” So, ProgressOhio did little 
more than parrot back the vague language employed by the court in 
Sheward. It did nothing to define what qualifies as a “rare and 
extraordinary” issue or what passes as a “serious” public injury. It did, 
however, narrow the public-right doctrine to apply only to original 
actions in mandamus and/or prohibition. 
The court in Walgate, decided in March 2016 held a group of 
plaintiffs did not have standing to sue the state over legislation 
establishing casinos. The court did nothing in Walgate to change or 
amend the public-rights exception, as it analyzed all of plaintiffs’ 
standing arguments under traditional standing tests. The dissent argued 
the court erred in ignoring the exception, and that plaintiffs raised issues 
that were important enough to enough Ohioans to warrant standing 
under the exception. While the dissent addressed the importance of the 
issues (in that millions of Ohioans voted on the bill), it did not provide 
any further guidance on what makes an issue important more generally. 
How many millions need to vote on an issue to raise it to the level of 
significance needed to invoke the exception? If only one million, instead 
of three million, had voted for this bill, would the dissent have 
considered it important enough? Finally, it similarly did not address the 
“serious public injury” prong of the exception.   
Husted, another case decided in 2016, likewise did little to add to the 
exception’s definition.  It held the plaintiff did not have standing under 
the exception because she misapplied precedent, and her other public-
rights standing arguments mirrored those rejected by the court in 
ProgressOhio. Thus, it did nothing to clarify or amend any part of the 
exception. 
Finally, in Food & Water Watch, decided in 2018, the court appears 
to have stood on the precipice of overruling Sheward, and instead chose 
to further undermine its central holding and chip away at its 
applicability. The court suggested that it will likely never apply Sheward 
again, noting that it has not done so in 15 years and that plaintiffs’ issue 
19
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did not rise to rare and extraordinary, even assuming the court would 
still grant a party a public-right-doctrine exception to standing in any 
case. It emphasized that it would entertain a public action only in the 
rare and extraordinary situation where the challenged statute operates 
directly (and broadly) to divest the courts of judicial power, that 
Sheward provides questionable authority “at best,” and that its use 
should be avoided so the court does not run afoul of Ohio’s prohibition 
on advisory opinions. Thus, the court here emphasized that Sheward’s 
holding was intended to apply only to situations in which an enactment 
threatened to divest the judicial branch of its power and that the ground 
on which it originally stood was “deeply divided” and “questionable.” 
In sum, the exception exists today in essentially the same amorphous 
form as it was when Sheward was decided. It allows for standing when a 
plaintiff brings a “public action” in mandamus or prohibition, presenting 
“rare and extraordinary” issues that threaten “serious public injury.”129  
IV.  THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO SHOULD ABANDON THE PUBLIC-
RIGHTS EXCEPTION 
The following section addresses a few of the numerous reasons why 
the Supreme Court of Ohio should abandon the public-rights exception. 
The reasons begin narrow and broaden, arguing first that practically 
speaking, the exception is so vague and undefined that it cannot 
realistically be applied. Next, it addresses broader constitutional 
concerns, arguing that the exception violates longstanding separation of 
powers principles by impermissibly expanding the scope of judicial 
authority, and lastly that the Ohio General Assembly is capable of, and 
is charged with, the duty of crafting specialized standing rules in 
enacting legislation.  
 
 
 129. It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Ohio has, in one other instance, granted 
standing under the public rights exception. In the case of State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bureau of 
Workers' Comp., 780 N.E.2d 981 (2002), a union and union president sought to prevent enforcement of 
H.B. 122, a law permitting warrantless drug and alcohol testing of injured workers. The court found 
standing under the exception because it found the issue presented a public right of sufficient magnitude. 
The law affected every injured worker in Ohio who sought to participate in Workers’ Comp. Further, it 
affected everyone who worked in Ohio because every worker could be subject to “unreasonable 
searches,” and the right to be free from unreasonable searches constitutes a “core right” (as it is 
fundamental enough to be embodied in the Bill of Rights). Because the focus of this article is on recent 
decisions, this decision is not discussed at length. See State ex rel. Ohio AFL-CIO v. Ohio Bureau of 
Workers' Comp., 780 N.E.2d 981 (2002). 
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A.  The Public-Rights Exception Is Unworkably Vague130 
Some commentators argue that judicial flexibility in standing is 
appropriate, for a number of reasons.131 One key argument in favor 
this broader conception of justiciability at the state court level is that 
increased access to the courts will inspire increased political 
participation “by facilitating adjudicative practices that afford 
additional avenues for political expression and that provide an 
alternative point of entry into political life.”132 The argument goes 
that when people have access to “the public space of the courtroom,” 
they can “find themselves engaged and mobilized through the 
transformative effects of a deliberative discourse.”133 In this light, 
courts serve to continually construct and reconstruct social life itself 
and loosened justiciability gives citizens an increased role in public 
decisionmaking by giving voice to “dissident and plural views.”134  
Although the ideas above have merit in the abstract, and may work 
for some state systems and some judicially-crafted standing 
exceptions, the fact is that Ohio’s public-rights exception has proved 
itself unworkable in practice. The above noted proponent of the 
loosened theory of justiciability acknowledges that “additional 
scholarship is necessary to translate these broad aims into doctrinal 
standards and manageable rules.”135 Unfortunately, Ohio’s muddied 
history with the exception reveals that the public-rights exception is not 
one such “manageable rule.”  
The public-rights exception has no set parameters, making it nearly 
impossible to apply. Sheward itself, the exception’s founding 
decision, defines the public-rights exception in vague, abstract 
 
 130. Under Ohio law, precedent may be overturned if it satisfies three requirements. These 
requirements, as laid out in the Galatis decision, are: “(1) the decision was wrongly decided at that time, 
or changes in circumstances no longer justify continued adherence to the decision, (2) the decision 
defies  practical workability, and (3) abandoning the precedent would not create an undue hardship for 
those who have relied upon it.” Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St. 3d 216, 216-217 (Ohio 
2003). Although the following sections only address the unworkability of the exception, arguments can 
and have been made that Sheward satisfies all three of the above requirements. For more information, 
see Brief of Amici Curiae Ohio Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellants JobsOhio, et all. at 
18-2120, ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 139 Ohio St.3d 520 (Ohio 2014). 
 131. This article addresses a key argument in favor of expanded standing doctrines: increased 
political involvement by providing an avenue for citizens to involve themselves in the political process 
and air their differing views. Additional arguments include: the idea that increased access to courts 
promotes community and “public goods,” curbs curb faction-dominated decisionmaking, and cures 
“adverse externalities and spillovers.” For a fuller analysis of all arguments in favor of loosened 
justiciability, see Helen Hershkoff’s article, supra note 26.  
 132. Hershkoff, supra note 26, at 1917. 
 133. Id.   
 134. Id. at 1919.  
 135. Id. at 1930. 
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language, referring to “rare and extraordinary issues” threatening 
“serious public injury.” As one commentator notes, “‘public rights’” 
are difficult to objectively define,” let alone apply.136 Yet, neither the 
Sheward decision nor any later case addressing the exception further 
defines what kind of issues qualify as “rare” or “extraordinary.” 
Although Sheward sets the exception as narrow, it gives no guidance 
on when a court should apply the exception.137 It essentially “sets 
litigants and jurists down a seemingly endless path of unfettered court 
access, leaving traditional standing rules in their wake.”138 The problem 
of how to apply Sheward “plagues every case where Sheward’s public 
rights exception is invoked.”139  
For example, the plaintiffs in the ProgressOhio case, while invoking 
the exception, struggled with how to frame the Sheward holding.140  
They argued there was no way of declaring one public right more 
important than another, and contended that even the drafters of the Ohio 
Constitution would have disagreed as to what public rights were the 
most important.141 If neither the courts, nor plaintiffs, nor, 
hypothetically, the drafters of the Ohio Constitution, can make sense of 
the exception, surly jurists cannot be the ones expected to make sense of 
it all.142  
The ambiguity and amorphous nature of the exception may be due 
to the court’s extreme desire to strike down the legislation at issue in 
Sheward. One commentator suggests “the court simply desired to 
address the issue of tort reform and was willing to disregard decades of 
consistent, sound law in order to do so,” instead of waiting for a party 
with a cognizable injury to challenge the new legislation and striking it 
down as it had when it initially declared the legislation 
unconstitutional.143 Thus, the court created the exception solely for the 
purpose of reaching the merits of Sheward. In this light, Sheward is 
merely part of “the court's on-going trend of controversial discourse and 
irresponsible judicial activism” and was likely not meant to set down 
any legitimate exception which could be used or applied in the future.144 
 
 136. Brief of Amici Curiae Ohio Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellants JobsOhio, et 
all. at 18, ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 139 Ohio St. 3d 520 (Ohio 2014). 
 137. Id. at 20,  
 138. Id. at 21. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id.  
 142. Id.  
 143. Jonathan I. Blake, State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward: The 
Extraordinary Application of Extraordinary Writs and Other Issues; The Case That Never Should Have 
Been, 29 CAP. U.L. REV. 433, 476 (2001). 
 144. Id. at 477. This idea may be further bolstered by the fact that public rights exceptions are not 
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Instead, it was a “quick-fix” to the problem at hand—striking down, for 
the second time, the unconstitutional tort reform bill. The court had 
neither incentive nor desire to set down anything other than what the 
exception is today, vague and elusive. 
B.  The Exception Violates Separation of Powers Principles  
Separation of powers is one of the most important governmental 
constraints, both at the federal and state levels. It is a constitutionally 
based doctrine designed to uphold the limited role of courts in a 
democratic society.145 It ensures that each of the three branches of 
government function only within its own sphere of power, and that 
none usurps power reserved for the other two.146 The Ohio 
Constitution, like the federal Constitution, adheres to the separation 
of powers. It abides by the idea that each branch must “endeavor to 
cabin its powers and responsibilities to those appropriate for the 
particular branch.”147  
Traditional standing requirements protect the separation of powers. 
They “are not simply ends in themselves.”148 They both “reflect and 
enforce the separation of powers.”149 The judicial branch is charged 
with resolving legitimate legal disputes. Traditional standing, which 
requires injury, causation, and a remedy which the court can give, 
“ensure[s] that the judicial branch stays within its authority to decide 
actual legal disputes rather than opine on abstract, generalized 
matters dedicated to the legislative branch and the political 
process.”150 It ensures the court addresses the concrete issue before 
it—a citizen, injured by defendant, seeking legal redress. Standing 
rules prevent parties with no personal stake in the outcome from 
initiating legislation on behalf of the public generally.151 Were the 
judiciary to address every question under the constitution, it “might 
take possession of ‘almost every subject proper for legislative 
discussion and decision” and could lead to stand-offs between the 
 
a trend in other jurisdictions. Instead, “[s]ince Sheward was decided, other States have declined to adopt 
such an exception.” Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 20. 
 145. John Roberts, Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1220 (1993). 
 146. “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system of government 
than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.” Raines v. 
Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). The Ohio Constitution, modeled after the federal one, similarly respects 
the bounds of separation of powers.  
 147. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 9. 
 148. Id. at 5. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 8. 
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branches of government.152 One commentator described the Sheward 
decision as “an external clash between the legislature and the judiciary . 
. . over the proper scope of judicial power.”153  This commentator 
believed “both branches fired their best shots in stubborn attempts to 
assert their respective fortitude.”154 This result—branches “firing shots” 
at each other—is what separation of powers was designed to prevent.  
Traditional standing rules not only protect the separation of 
powers, they also ensure that decisions overturning pieces of 
legislation carry their proper weight. The court undoubtedly has a 
responsibility to determine the constitutionality of actions by the 
other branches of government. This “power of constitutional 
adjudication is secured exclusively in the judiciary as a check upon the 
other branches of government.”155 However, this duty is served best 
“when the parties present a genuine dispute to the judiciary, not a 
request for an advisory opinion.”156 The judiciary can best carry out 
its duty to check the other branches when presented with a concrete 
injury, as its decision will carry the full weight and power of judicial 
authority, having come from the “ideal” judicial process. Citizens 
should not be able to invoke the judicial system in order to serve the 
purposes of interest groups or to resolve ideological differences 
through “concerned bystanders,” instead of through those who are 
actually affected by a judgment.157  
In addition, practically speaking, traditional standing ensures that 
the limited resources of the court system are used properly.158 
Justiciability “serves a signaling function” to plaintiffs, deterring some 
 
 152. Id. at 6. Further, Ohio standing requirements should always mimic federal ones. The “logical 
interpretation in the state constitution is that it tracks federal standing requirements” Id. at 9. The Ohio 
Constitution does not allow for advisory opinions, although the constitutions of many other states do. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Ohio has disclaimed the right to make advisory opinions. Id. So, 
“neither the plain text of the Ohio Constitution nor any information about the adoption, ratification, or 
original public meaning of the relevant provisions justifies departure in Ohio from the application of 
federal standing requirements.” Id. Finally, the court “has a long history of following federal standing 
requirements when interpreting what grounds must be shown for a plaintiff to bring a case in Ohio 
courts” Id. at 10. The Supreme Court of Ohio adheres to federal cases from 1910 to the present time. 
Where the provisions of the two constitutions are similar and there is no reason to differ their 
interpretations, the Court has interpreted the Ohio constitution in line with federal standing precedent. 
Id. 
 153. Basil Loeib, Abuse of Power: Certain State Courts are Disregarding Standing and Original 
Jurisdiction Principles So They Can Declare Tort Reform Unconstitutional, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 491, 491 
(2000). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 504. 
 156. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 8. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 32.  
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from and encouraging others to file claims.159 Relaxed standing 
requirements changes this signal, thus increasing the number of suits 
filed “without ensuring their merit.”160 Were citizens able to challenge 
legislation simply as taxpaying citizens, they could “simply carry [] 
political fight[s] to the courts” and overload the courts’ dockets.161 This 
concern becomes particularly acute when one considers the fact that 
state courts already manage larger dockets than federal courts do. With 
relaxed standing, added burden on state courts “could cause the 
allocation of judicial resources to shift in unfair and inefficient ways.”162 
The judicial system’s decisions carry the most weight both when they 
address concerns that fall squarely within the scope of their duty and 
when their resources can be appropriately focused on these concerns 
they are charged with resolving.  
While traditional standing protects separation of powers, the 
public-rights exception blurs the line between the judicial and 
legislative branches. The exception allows the court to decide the 
constitutionality of a legislative act where the person asking for 
review of the act has not been genuinely affected by it in any way. In 
essence, the person has a generalized grievance dressed up as a legal 
matter, seeking the court to resolve what the legislature is charged 
with dealing with. The Sheward court overreached its constitutional 
bounds, and essentially “enable[d] the court to embody its opinion in 
law—the exclusive province of the legislature.”163  
C.  The Ohio General Assembly Has The Power To Grant Non-
Traditional Standing 
Not only is it the General Assembly’s duty to create substantive 
law, but it also has the authority to grant specialized standing. Ohio’s 
General Assembly is the lawmaking body of the state. As such, it has 
the power, when enacting legislation, to craft specialized standing 
which would allow citizens to invoke the power of the courts even 
when they are not personally injured by the legislation.164 Much like 
Congress can in enacting federal legislation, Ohio’s General 
Assembly has the power to “cloak parties with the degree of personal 
interest necessary to satisfy standing requirements” by enacting a 
statute allowing them to sue, where traditional standing doctrine 
 
 159. Hershkoff, supra note 26, at 1932. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 4. 
 162. Hershkoff, supra note 26, at 1932. 
 163. Blake, supra note 124, at 479. 
 164. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 3. 
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would bar their suit.165  
Further, Ohio’s history shows that the legislature is willing to do 
this, as there are a number of situations in which the General 
Assembly has granted specialized standing.166 In one instance, it has 
authorized county taxpayers to sue in some cases where the county 
prosecutor fails to do so.167 Thus, there is already a degree of 
flexibility built into standing doctrines, which allows non-injured 
parties to invoke the power of the courts.168  
Finally, the legislature is in a better position than the judiciary to 
“weigh the necessity, and the advantages and disadvantages, of such 
provisions.”169 A court, when deciding a case, is under significant time 
constraints; a legislature, when writing and debating legislation, is not. 
Ultimately, plaintiffs need personalized grievances to come before 
the judiciary, but “No one needs standing to petition the political 
branches (legislative and executive) to enact, repeal, enforce or not 
enforce laws or policies.”170 Generalized grievances, shared by the 
public at large, should always channel through the political process.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
To many, justiciability exists in the abstract, as some vague and 
looming concept of “the role of the courts,” to be discussed and 
debated in a classroom as an “academic indulgence.”171 Standing, 
however, has real implications in the practical, day-to-day workings 
of courts across the nation, and in Ohio specifically. Standing, 
ripeness, mootness, and all the other subsets of justiciability “serve as 
gatekeepers to the state courthouse.”172 They determine whether 
significant public questions can be brought before a court, and, if so, 
who may bring them and at what time. Undoubtedly, public questions 
involving the constitutionality of certain pieces of legislation can and 
should make their way before the judiciary. However, those bringing 
these questions need to be the right parties—that is, they need to be 
parties legitimately affected, in a concrete way, by the issue they bring. 
Exceptions to this rule conflate the branches of government and take 
from the legislature its duty to craft specialized standing rules. The 
 
 165. Id. at 12.  
 166. Id. at 13. Additionally, the legislature “has authorized municipal taxpayers who seemingly 
lack traditional standing to bring suit when the municipality decides not to do so” in R.C. 733.59.  Id. 
 167. Id. See also R.C. 309.13. 
 168. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 5, at 13. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 6. 
 171. Hershkoff, supra note 26, at 1838. 
 172. Id.  
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Sheward exception, hastily forged in the need of a passing moment, and 
impossible to define or apply outside of that moment, is an 
unsustainable departure from traditional standing, and should be 
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